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Postcolonial Studies and the Challenge of 
Climate Change
Dipesh Chakrabarty
For Homi K. Bhabha
However we come to the question of postcolonial studies at this historical juncture, there are two phenomena, both topics of public debate since the early 1990s, that none of us can quite 
escape in our personal and collective lives at present: globalization and 
global warming. All thinking about the present has to engage both. What 
I do in this essay is to use some of the recent writings of Homi K. Bhabha 
to illustrate how a leading contemporary postcolonial thinker imagines 
the figure of the human in the era of what is often called “neoliberal” 
capitalism, and then enter a brief discussion of the debate on climate 
change to see how postcolonial thinking may need to be stretched to 
adjust itself to the reality of global warming. My ultimate proposition in 
this essay is simple: that the current conjuncture of globalization and 
global warming leaves us with the challenge of having to think of human 
agency over multiple and incommensurable scales at once. 
The nineteenth century left us with some internationalist and univer-
sal ideologies, prominent among them Marxism and liberalism, both 
progenies in different ways of the Enlightenment. Anticolonial thought 
was born of that lineage. The waves of decolonization movements of the 
1950s and 60s were followed by postcolonial criticism that was placed, 
in the universities of the Anglo-American countries at least, as brother-
in-arms to cultural studies. Together, cultural studies and postcolonial 
criticism fed into the literature on globalization, though globalization 
studies, as such, also drew on developments in the cognate disciplines 
of sociology, economics, and anthropology. Now we have a literature 
on global warming and a general sense of an environmental crisis that 
is no doubt mediated by the inequities of capitalist development, but 
it is a crisis that faces humanity as a whole. In all these moves, we are 
left with three images of the human: the universalist-Enlightenment 
view of the human as potentially the same everywhere, the subject with 
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capacity to bear and exercise rights; the postcolonial-postmodern view 
of the human as the same but endowed everywhere with what some 
scholars call “anthropological difference”—differences of class, sexuality, 
gender, history, and so on. This second view is what the literature on 
globalization underlines. And then comes the figure of the human in 
the age of the Anthropocene, the era when humans act as a geological 
force on the planet, changing its climate for millennia to come. If criti-
cal commentary on globalization focuses on issues of anthropological 
difference, the scientific literature on global warming thinks of humans 
as constitutively one—a species, a collectivity whose commitment to 
fossil-fuel based, energy-consuming civilization is now a threat to that 
civilization itself. These views of the human do not supersede one an-
other. One cannot put them along a continuum of progress. No one 
view is rendered invalid by the presence of others. They are simply dis-
junctive. Any effort to contemplate the human condition today—after 
colonialism, globalization, and global warming—on political and ethical 
registers encounters the necessity of thinking disjunctively about the 
human, through moves that in their simultaneity appear contradictory. 
But since I come to all these questions as someone trained in the 
discipline of history, allow me to approach them via this discipline and 
by way of a brief historical detour. And I apologize in advance for the 
slight intrusion of the autobiographical at this point, for I was also a 
witness to the history I recount here. My entry into the field of post-
colonial studies, quite fittingly for someone interested in the theme of 
belatedness, was late.1 Postcolonial ideas, as we know, took by storm 
departments of English literature in the Anglo-American academe in the 
1980s. Now when I look at back on it, postcolonial studies seem to have 
been a part, initially at least, of a cultural and critical process by which 
a postimperial West adjusted itself to a long process of decolonization 
that perhaps is not over yet. After all, it cannot be without significance 
that what brought Stuart Hall, Homi Bhabha, and Isaac Julien together 
to read Fanon in the London of the late 1980s and the 1990s was the 
struggle against racism in a postimperial Britain, a struggle sometimes 
given official backing by the radical Greater London Council and hosted 
by the Institute of Contemporary Art.2 
The American scene with regard to postcolonial studies was admittedly 
somewhat different. Edward Said wrote Orientalism (1978) out of his sense 
of involvement in the Palestinian struggle and Gayatri Spivak, I assume, 
was responding in part to the culture wars on American campuses about 
opening up core curriculum (as at Stanford in the late 1980s) and rede-
fining the literary canon when she introduced the Indian feminist writer 
Mahasweta Devi to academic readers in the United States. Australian 
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developments that I personally witnessed in these years drew on both 
English and North-American instances. I got drawn into debates about 
“culture as distinction” and about the literary canon that took place 
in the meetings of the Arts Faculty at the University of Melbourne in 
the late 1980s. A leading scholar in those debates was Simon During, 
a pioneer in what was then emerging as the field of cultural studies.3 
The University of Essex conferences on postcolonial studies had just 
taken place. I was aware of During’s involvement in those conferences. 
Lata Mani, then a graduate student with the History of Consciousness 
Program at the University of California–Santa Cruz, had published a 
path-breaking paper on “sati” in one of their proceedings volumes.4 But 
the volumes still had not impacted the world of historians. We began 
to publish Subaltern Studies in India in 1983 without much awareness of 
postcolonial literary criticism. I remember Simon During returning to 
Melbourne in the mid-80s from a postcolonialism conference overseas 
and asking me if I knew of the work of Homi Bhabha. I answered, with 
some surprise but as any educated newspaper-reading Indian would have 
answered in those days, “Sure, a major Indian Atomic Research Centre 
is named after him. He was one of our best physicists; but why would 
you be interested in him?” That was the day the other Homi Bhabha 
entered my life, as a problem of mistaken identity, through a stand-in, 
as a question of difference within the identity “Homi Bhabha” (to mimic 
my dear friend who bears that name).
Subaltern Studies, the historiographical movement with which I was as-
sociated, emerged out of anti-, and not postcolonial, thought. We were 
a bunch of young men (initially men) interested in Indian history and 
were in some ways disillusioned with the nationalisms of our parents. 
The two Englishmen in the group, David Arnold and David Hardiman, 
were anti-imperial in their political outlook and rejected the domi-
nantly proimperial historiography that came out of England. The Indian 
members of the group were disappointed and angry about the Indian 
nation’s failure to deliver the social justice that anticolonial nationalism 
had promised. Our historiographical rebellion raised many interesting 
methodological issues for Indian history and for history in general. 
Ranajit Guha, our mentor, could easily be seen as one of the pioneers 
of the so-called linguistic turn in the discipline of history though, it has 
to be acknowledged, Hayden White had already raised many of the most 
pertinent issues in the 1970s.5 Our analyses of subaltern histories were 
deeply influenced by Guha’s infectious enthusiasm for structuralism of 
the kind that was associated with Barthes, Jakobson, and Levi-Strauss, a 
structuralism one could also associate with Hayden White and with an 
early moment of cultural studies—especially in Britain where the New 
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Accent series of publications emphasized the importance of structural-
ism, and where Guha was originally based. Gramsci—with a selection 
of his prison notebooks translated into English in 1971—had softened 
the Stalinist edges of our Indo-British Marxism and attuned us to the 
importance of the popular, and Mao—many of the historians in the 
group had earlier been involved in the Maoist movement that took 
place in India between 1967 and 1971—had helped us to think of the 
peasant as a modern revolutionary subject. But we did not encounter 
postcolonial thought until Spivak brought our group into contact with 
her deconstructionist variety of Marxism and feminism, and made us 
confront our theoretical innocence in proposing to make the subaltern 
the “subject” of his or her own history. As we pondered the challenge 
she posed to the group and embraced its consequences, we crossed 
over from being merely anticolonial historians (with incipient critiques 
of the nation-state form) to being a part of the intellectual landscape 
of postcolonial criticism. 
What was the difference? one might ask. The difference was signaled 
by Spivak’s epochal essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” that she had begun 
to draft in response to the Subaltern Studies project and before our first 
meeting with her took place.6 The human in our anticolonial mode of 
thinking was a figure of sovereignty. We wanted to make the peasant or 
the subaltern the subject of his or her history, period. And we thought 
of this subject in the image of the autonomous rights-bearing person 
with the same access to representation in national and other histories 
as others from more privileged backgrounds enjoyed. A straightforward 
plea for social justice underlay our position, just as it did in a variety 
of Marxist, feminist, or even liberal histories. And like Fanon, we saw 
the subaltern classes as claiming their humanity through revolutionary 
upheavals. Becoming human was for us a matter of becoming a subject.7 
This was why Spivak’s exercise in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” was so 
salutary. It challenged the very idea of the “subject” that Subaltern Stud-
ies and much anticolonial thought celebrated and invited us to write 
deconstructive histories of subjecthood. 
This critique of the subject was not the same as that performed by 
Althusserian antihumanism of the 1960s and 70s that so riled E. P. 
Thompson, the great humanist historian of the last century.8 Postcolo-
nial critique of the subject was actually a deeper turning towards the 
human, a move best exemplified for me in the work of Homi Bhabha. It 
was a turn that both appreciated difference as a philosophical question 
and at the same time repudiated its essentialization by identity politics.9 
That single move—channeled not through identity politics but through 
difference philosophies—connected postcolonial thinking to thinking 
about the human condition in the age of globalization. 
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To appreciate the close political relations that existed between “rights” 
thinking and the body of postcolonial thought that drew on the post-
structuralist critique of the subject, we have to get beyond some of 
the fruitless debates of the 1990s. I think it was a mistake of the Left 
on both sides of the postmodern divide in the 1990s to think of these 
two different figurations of the human—the human as a rights-bearing 
subject and the figure of the human glimpsed through the critique 
of the subject—as somehow competing with each other in a do-or-die 
race in which only the fittest survived. The critique of the subject did 
not make the idea of the autonomous subject useless any more than 
the critique of the nation-state made the institution of the nation-state 
obsolete. What I have learnt from postcolonial thinkers is the necessity 
to move through contradictory figures of the human, now through a 
collapsing of the person and the subject as in liberal or Marxist thought, 
and now through a separation of the two. Before I discuss what forces 
us to engage in such border-crossing in our thinking, let me illustrate 
the fleet-footed movement I am speaking of by turning to some recent 
writings of Homi K. Bhabha. 
The Human in Postcolonial Criticism Today
Listen to Bhabha writing of the new subaltern classes of today, “the 
stateless,” “migrant workers, minorities, asylum seekers, [and] refugees” 
who “represent emergent, undocumented lifeworlds that break through 
the formal language of ‘protection’ and ‘status’ because”—he says, quot-
ing Balibar—“they are ‘neither insiders [n]or outsiders, or (for many of us) 
. . . insiders officially considered outsiders.”10 Classic Bhabha, one would have 
thought, this turning over of the outside into the inside and vice versa. 
Yet it is not the “cosmopolitan claims of global ethical equivalence” that 
Bhabha reads into these new subalterns of the global capitalist order. 
His eyes are fixed as much on the deprivation that the human condi-
tion suffers in these circumstances as they are on the question of rights: 
“As insiders/outsiders they damage the cosmopolitan dream of a ‘world 
without borders’ . . . by opening up, in the midst of international polity, 
a complex and contradictory mode of being or surviving somewhere in 
between legality and incivility. It is a kind of no-man’s land that, in the 
world of migration, shadows global success . . . it substitutes cultural 
survival in migrant milieux for full civic participation.”11
“Full civic participation”—one can see at once the normative horizons 
on which Bhabha has set his sights. They are indeed those that acknowl-
edge that our recognition of the human condition in the everyday does 
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not eo ipso negate questions of social justice. On the contrary. Bhabha, 
of course, acknowledges the fact that the politics of (cultural) survival 
often takes the place of “full civic participation” in the lives of these new 
subalterns of the global economy. But he has to move between these 
poles (survival versus civic participation) to see the subaltern politics 
of cultural survival not only as a zone of creativity and improvisation—
which it is—but also as an area of privation and disenfranchisement. 
It will be interesting, then, to see how it is precisely this freedom that 
Bhabha claims for himself to think contradictorily—to think mobility 
(survival) and stasis (civic participation) at the same time—that allows 
him to turn the tables on his erstwhile critics, Michael Hardt and An-
tonio Negri, who found in “nomadism and miscegenation” “figures of 
virtue, the first ethical practices on the terrain of Empire,” since, they 
argued, “circulation” or “deterritorialisation” were steps towards the goal 
of global citizenship that entailed “the struggle against the slavery of 
belonging to a nation, an identity and a people, and thus the desertion 
from sovereignty and the limits it places on subjectivity” were for them 
and this reason “entirely positive” developments.12 “Such an emancipa-
tory ideal,” writes Bhaba, “—so fixated on the flowing, borderless, global 
world—neglects to confront the fact that migrants, refugees, or nomads 
do not merely circulate.” Rather, he goes on to point out:
They need to settle, claim asylum or nationality, demand housing and educa-
tion, assert their economic and cultural rights, and seek the status of citizen-
ship. It is salutary, then, to turn to less “circulatory” forms of the economy like 
trade and tariffs, or taxes and monetary policy—much less open to postmodern 
metaphoric appropriation—to see how they impact on the global imaginary of 
diasporic cultural studies. Positive global relations depend on the protection 
and enhancement of these national “territorial” resources, which should then 
become part of the “global” political economy of resource redistribution and a 
transnational moral economy of redistributive justice.13
The point of these long quotations is simply to show how juxtaposed 
and crossed-over remain the two figures of the human in these discus-
sions by Bhabha: the human of the everyday who illustrates the human 
condition as the embodiment of what Bhabha once called “difference 
within”—the insider as the outsider and vice versa—the human who 
improvises and survives, and the human who asserts his or her cultural 
and economic rights in the expectation of being the sovereign figure 
of the citizen some day. 
This constant movement between normative and onto-existential 
images of the human in Bhabha’s prose is an index of the human 
predicament produced by dominant forms of globalization. Bhabha 
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turns to Hannah Arendt to explain this predicament. Arendt had once 
argued that the very creation of a “One World” through the positing of 
so many “peoples” organized into nation-states produced the problem 
of statelessness, not from “a lack of civilization” but as “the perverse 
consequence of the political and cultural conditions of modernity.”14 
Modernity created this new “savage” condition of many human beings, 
the condition of being declared stateless if they could not be identified 
with a nation-state, forcing them to fall back on the politics of survival. 
Today, it is not simply the arrangement of nation-states that creates this 
condition of stateless, illegal migrants, guest workers, and asylum seek-
ers. It is a deeper predicament produced by both the globalization of 
capital and the pressures of demography in poorer countries brought 
about by the unevenness of postcolonial development. Whether you read 
Mike Davis on The Planet of Slums or documents produced by Abahlali 
baseMjondolo, the shack-dwellers’ movement in Durban, South Africa, 
it is clear that today’s capitalism feeds off a large pool of migrant, often 
illegal, labor that is cast aside by many as “surplus population”—a proc-
ess that deprives these groups of the enjoyment of any social goods and 
services, while their labor remains critical to the functioning of the service 
sector in both advanced and growing economies.15 At the same time, it 
has to be acknowledged, refugees and asylum seekers are produced also 
by state-failures connected to a whole series of factors: economic, politi-
cal, demographic, and environmental. Together, these groups, today’s 
subaltern classes, embody the human condition negatively, as an image 
of privation. No ethnography of their everyday lives can access its object 
positively through the figure of the citizen. Yet our normative horizons, 
belonging as we analysts do to one or another kind of civil society, cannot 
but depend on the measure of “cultural and economic rights” and “full 
civic participation,” even as any real possibility of effective citizenship 
for all humans seems increasingly remote. Do not one billion human 
beings already live without access to proper drinking water? When will 
the illegal Bangladeshi and North-African workers one encounters on 
the streets of Athens, Florence, Rome, Vienna, Paris, London—not to 
speak of illegal Bangladeshi labor in the informal sectors of India and 
Pakistan—become full-fledged European citizens? There is one predica-
ment of our thinking, however, that speaks to the contradictions of our 
lifeworlds today. Our normative horizons, unlike those of Marx’s classical 
writings, say, give us no vantage point from which we could not only judge 
but also describe and know these classes, while ethnographies of what 
the marginal, the poor, and the excluded actually do in order to survive 
yield no alternative norms for human societies that are still in the grip 
of large and centralizing institutions, corporations, and bureaucracies.16
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This disjuncture is at its most acute now in what progressive European 
theorists such as Etienne Balibar or Sandro Mezzadra write by way of 
placing refugees, asylum seekers, and illegal immigrants in European his-
tory, politics, and policy.17 It may or may not surprise the reader to know 
that Europe today is dotted with detention centers for these unwelcome 
people. The number of such centers exceeds one hundred and they 
extend outside Europe into North Africa.18 Europe has adopted border 
protection policies that are reminiscent of those pursued by the United 
States or Australia, except that in Europe the borders, if a detention 
camp is indeed a border, are as much inside Europe as outside. It is this 
indeterminacy of borders that has led Balibar to make the observation 
that if the nineteenth century was the time when European imperial-
ism made frontiers into borders by exporting the border-form outside 
Europe, we stand today on the threshold of an age when borders are 
becoming frontiers again.19 
However, reading Balibar and Mezzadra on these questions makes 
it clear that their writing is caught in tension between two tendencies: 
on the one hand they have to acknowledge the historical and current 
barbarisms that have in the past acted as a foundation of European 
“civilization” and continue to do so to some extent even in the present; 
on the other hand they have to appeal to the highest utopians ideals 
of their civilizational heritage in order to imagine into being a vibrant 
European polity that not only practices the ethics of hospitality and 
responsibility that Derrida, Levinas, and others have written about, but 
that also grounds itself in a deep acceptance of the plurality of human 
inheritances inside its own borders.20 It is no wonder, then, that Euro-
pean intellectuals, whether discussing refugees from outside Europe 
or internal migrants from the ex-colonies and the question of “Eastern 
Europe,” are increasingly debating postcolonial theory and are even 
producing their own readers and translations of postcolonial writings.21 
Europe today is clearly a new frontier of postcolonial studies—and not 
because the classical peasant-subaltern subject can be found in Europe. 
No, it is because the new subalterns of the global economy—refugees, 
asylum seekers, illegal workers—can be found all over Europe and it is 
by making these groups the object of his thinking that Homi Bhabha 
arrives at a figure of the human that is constitutionally and necessarily 
doubled and contradictory. 
Let me now turn to the issue of global warming to consider how it 
challenges us to imagine the human. 
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The Human in the Anthropocene
If the problem of global warming or climate change had not burst 
in on us through the 2007 Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), globalization would have been perhaps the most 
important theme stoking our thoughts about being human. But global 
warming adds another challenge. It calls us to visions of the human that 
neither rights talk nor the critique of the subject ever contemplated. 
This does not, as I said before, make those earlier critiques irrelevant 
or redundant, for climate change will produce—and has begun to pro-
duce—its own cases of refugees and regime failures.22 The effects of 
climate change are mediated by the global inequities we already have. 
So the two visions of the human that I have already outlined—the uni-
versalist view of global justice between human individuals imagined as 
having the same rights everywhere and the critique of the subject that 
poststructuralism once promoted—will both remain operative. In discuss-
ing issues of climate justice, we will thus necessarily go through familiar 
moves: criticize the self-aggrandizing tendencies of powerful and rich 
nations and speak of a progressive politics of differentiated responsibili-
ties in handling debates about migration, legal or illegal. Indeed, one 
of the early significant tracts to be written on the problem and politics 
of global warming was authored by two respected Indian environmental 
activists who gave it the title, Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case 
of Environmental Colonialism.23 The science and politics of climate change 
have not rendered these moves irrelevant or unnecessary; but they have 
become insufficient as analytical strategies.24 
Consider the challenge that climate science poses to humanists. 
Climate scientists raise a problem of scale for the human imagination, 
though they do not usually think through the humanistic implications 
of their own claim that, unlike the changes in climate this planet has 
seen in the past, the current warming is anthropogenic in nature. Hu-
mans, collectively, now have an agency in determining the climate of 
the planet as a whole, a privilege reserved in the past only for very large-
scale geophysical forces. This is where this crisis represents something 
different from what environmentalists have written about so far: the 
impact of humans on their immediate or regional environments. The 
idea of humans representing a force on a very large geological scale 
that impacts the whole planet is new. Some scientists, the Nobel-winning 
Paul J. Crutzen at the forefront, have proposed the beginning of a new 
geological era, an era in which human beings act as a force determining 
the climate of the entire planet all at once. They have suggested that we 
call this period “the Anthropocene” to mark the end of the Holocene 
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that named the geological “now” within which recorded human history 
so far has unfolded.25 But who is the “we” of this process? How do we 
think of this collective human agency in the era of the Anthropocene?
Scientists who work on the physical history of the universe or on the 
history of the earth’s climate in the past no doubt tell certain kinds of 
histories. But in Gadamerian or Diltheyan terms, they explain and are not 
required to understand the past in any humanist sense. Every individual 
explanation makes sense because it relates to other existing explanations. 
But a cognitive exercise is not “understanding” in the Gadamerian sense, 
and until there is an element of the latter, we do not have history, not 
human history at least. Which is why, usually, a purely “natural” history of 
climate over the last several million years would not be of much interest 
to a postcolonial historian who works on human history. 
What is remarkable about the current crisis is that climate scientists 
are not simply doing versions of natural history. They are also giving us 
an account of climate change that is neither purely “natural” nor purely 
“human” history. And this is because they assign an agency to humans 
at the very heart of this story. According to them, current global (and 
not regional) climate changes are largely human induced. This implies 
that humans are now part of the natural history of the planet. The wall 
of separation between natural and human histories that was erected in 
early modernity and reinforced in the nineteenth century as the human 
sciences and their disciplines consolidated themselves has some serious 
and long-running cracks in it.26 
The ascription of a geological agency to humans is a comparatively 
recent development in climate science. One of the earliest references 
I could find of scientists assigning to humans a role in the geophysical 
process of the planet was in a paper that the University of California, 
San Diego, oceanographer Roger Revelle and the University of Chicago 
geophysicist H. E. Suess coauthored in the geophysics journal Tellus in 
1957. “Human beings are now carrying out a large-scale geophysical 
experiment of a kind that could not have happened in the past nor be 
reproduced in the future,” they wrote. “Within a few centuries we are 
returning to the atmosphere and oceans the concentrated organic car-
bon stored in the sedimentary rocks over hundreds of millions of years. 
This experiment, if adequately documented, may yield a far-reaching 
insight into the processes determining weather and climate.”27 The 
Environmental Pollution Panel of the U.S. President’s Science Advisory 
Committee expressed the opinion in 1965 that “through his worldwide 
industrial civilization, Man is unwittingly conducting a vast geophysical 
experiment. Within a few generations, he is burning fossil fuel that 
slowly accumulated in the earth over the past 500 million years.” They 
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went on to warn: “The climatic changes that may be produced by the 
increased CO2 content could be deleterious from the point of view of 
human beings.”28 Even as late as 1973, the Committee on Atmospheric 
Sciences of the National Academy of Science said: “Man clearly has no 
positive knowledge of the magnitude or the manner in which he is pres-
ently changing the climate of the earth. There is no real question that 
inadvertent modification of the atmosphere is taking place.”29
We can thus see a progress or inflation, if you like, in the rhetoric 
of climate scientists. Man was an experimenter on a geophysical scale 
in the 1950s; by the 1990s, he was a geophysical force himself. Silently 
and implicitly, climate scientists have doubled the figure of the human 
as the agent of anthropogenic global warming (AGW). Humans put 
out greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the biosphere. Here the 
picture of the human is how social scientists have always imagined hu-
mans to be: a purposeful biological entity with the capacity to degrade 
natural environment. But what happens when we say humans are acting 
like a geophysical force? We then liken humans to some nonhuman, 
nonliving agency. That is why I say the science of anthropogenic global 
warming has doubled the figure of the human—you have to think of 
the two figures of the human simultaneously: the human-human and 
the nonhuman-human. And that is where some challenges lie for the 
postcolonial scholar in the humanities. 
The first challenge is the scale on which scientists invite us to imagine 
human agency. Consider the point that, collectively, we are now capable 
of affecting the climate of this planet and changing it, as the geophysicist 
David Archer says, for the next one hundred thousand years.30 Such 
numbers usually function as operators with which we manipulate informa-
tion. We do not understand them without training. Scientists are aware 
of this problem and do what historians do to bring vast scales within the 
realm of understanding: appeal to human experience. The Australian 
social and environmental historian Tom Griffiths recently published a 
splendid history of the Antarctic. But how does a social historian go 
about writing a human history of an uninhabited and uninhabitable vast 
expanse of snow and ice? Griffiths does what all good historians do: go 
to the experience that past humans have already had of such a region 
in order to write a human history of this place. He consults the private 
papers of historical explorers, looks at their letters to see how they ex-
perienced the place, and intercalates his reading of these documents 
with leaves from his own diary of traveling to the South Pole. This is 
how the Antarctic gets humanized. We use the metaphoric capacity of 
human language and visual records to bring its ice within the grasp of 
human experience. The Australian explorer Douglas Mawson went to 
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the Antarctic for the years 1911–14, having just become engaged to a 
Paquita Delprat of Broken Hill in Western Australia. In one of her love-
lorn letters to Mawson, Delprat wrote: “Are you frozen? In heart I mean 
. . . . Am I pouring out a little of what is in my heart to an iceberg? . . . 
Can a person remain in such cold and lonely regions however beautiful 
and still love warmly?” Mawson reassured her that her love had warmed 
her “proxy iceberg” and that “he felt less cold this time.”31 It is through 
such interleaving of experiences and through the employment of figures 
of speech—some telling metaphors and similes—that we make a human 
history of the empty vastness and ice of the South Pole. 
Scientists interested in creating an informed public around the crisis 
of climate change make a very similar appeal to experience. For reasons 
of space, I will illustrate the point with an example from David Archer’s 
book The Long Thaw. Archer distills out of his analysis a problem that 
turns around the explanation/understanding distinction I mentioned 
earlier. Human beings cannot really imagine beyond a couple of genera-
tions before and after their own time, he says. “The rules of economics, 
which govern much of our behavior,” he writes, “tend to limit our focus 
to even shorter time frames,” for the value of everything gets discounted 
in decades.32 Archer faces the problem that humans may not care for the 
science he is telling us about. One hundred thousand years is too far—why 
should we care for people so far into the future? “How would it feel,” 
Archer asks, trying to translate geological units into human scales, “if 
the ancient Greeks, for example, had taken advantage of some lucrative 
business opportunity for a few centuries, aware of potential costs, such as, 
say, a [much] stormier world, or the loss of . . . agricultural productivity 
to rising sea levels—that could persist to this day?”33 I find it remarkable 
as a historian that Archer, a socially concerned paleoclimatologist, should 
be asking us to extend to the future the faculty of understanding that 
historians routinely extend to humans of the recorded past. 
But this is also where we encounter a real problem of interpretation. 
We write of pasts through the mediation of the experience of humans of 
the past. We can send humans, or even artificial eyes, to outer space, the 
poles, the top of Mount Everest, to Mars and the Moon and vicariously 
experience that which is not directly available to us. We can also—through 
art and fiction—extend our understanding to those who in future may 
suffer the impact of the geophysical force that is the human. But we 
cannot ever experience ourselves as a geophysical force—though we 
now know that this is one of the modes of our collective existence. We 
cannot send somebody out to experience in an unmediated manner this 
“force” on our behalf (as distinct from experiencing the impact of it 
mediated by other direct experiences—of floods, storms, or earthquakes, 
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for example). This nonhuman, forcelike mode of existence of the hu-
man tells us that we are no longer simply a form of life that is endowed 
with a sense of ontology. Humans have a sense of ontic belonging. That 
is undeniable. We used that knowledge in developing both anticolonial 
(Fanon) and postcolonial criticism (Bhabha). But in becoming a geo-
physical force on the planet, we have also developed a form of collec-
tive existence that has no ontological dimension. Our thinking about 
ourselves now stretches our capacity for interpretive understanding. We 
need nonontological ways of thinking the human.
Bruno Latour has complained for a long time that the problem with 
modern political thought is the culture/nature distinction that has al-
lowed humans to look on their relationship to “nature” through the 
prism of the subject/object relationship.34 He has called for a new idea 
of politics that brings together—as active partners into our arguments—
both humans and nonhumans. I think what I have said adds a wrinkle 
to Latour’s problematic. A geophysical force—for that is what in part we 
are in our collective existence—is neither subject nor an object. A force 
is the capacity to move things. It is pure, nonontological agency. After 
all, Newton’s idea of “force” went back to medieval theories of impetus.35
Climate change is not a one-event problem. Nor is it amenable to a 
single rational solution. It may indeed be something like what Horst 
Rittel and Melvin Webber, planning theorists, once called a “wicked 
problem,” an expression they coined in 1973 in an article entitled “Di-
lemmas in a General Theory of Planning” published in Policy Sciences 
“to describe a category of public policy concern that [while susceptible 
to a rational diagnosis] defied rational and optimal solutions,” because 
it impinged on too many other problems to be solved or addressed at 
the same time.36 Besides, as Mike Hulme, a climate researcher, points 
out: “This global solution-structure also begs a fundamental question 
which is rarely addressed in the respective fora where these debates 
and disagreements surface: What is the ultimate performance metric 
for the human species, what is it that we are seeking to optimise? Is it 
to restabilise population or to minimise our ecological footprint? Is it to 
increase life expectancy, to maximise gross domestic product, to make 
poverty history or to increase the sum of global happiness? Or is the 
ultimate performance metric for humanity simply survival?”37
Given that it is difficult to foresee humanity arriving at a consensus 
on any of these questions in the short-term future, even while scientific 
knowledge about global warming circulates more widely, it is possible 
that the turn towards what Ulrich Beck calls a “risk society” will only be 
intensified in the current phase of globalization and global warming. As 
we cope with the effects of climate change and pursue capitalist growth, 
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we will negotiate our attachments, mediated no doubt through the ineq-
uities of capitalism, knowing fully that they are increasingly risky.38 But 
this also means that there is no “humanity” that can act as a self-aware 
agent. The fact that the crisis of climate change will be routed through 
all our “anthropological differences” can only mean that, however an-
thropogenic the current global warming may be in its origins, there is 
no corresponding “humanity” that in its oneness can act as a political 
agent. A place thus remains for struggles around questions on intrahu-
man justice regarding the uneven impacts of climate change. 
This is to underline how open the space is for what may be called the 
politics of climate change. Precisely because there is no single rational 
solution, there is the need to struggle to make our way in hitherto un-
charted ways—and hence through arguments and disagreements—to-
ward something like what Latour calls “the progressive composition of 
a common world.”39 Unlike the problem of the hole in the ozone layer, 
climate change is ultimately all about politics. Hence its openness as 
much to science and technology as to rhetoric, art, media, and arguments 
and conflicts conducted through a variety of means. The need then is 
to think the human on multiple scales and registers and as having both 
ontological and nonontological modes of existence. 
With regard to the climate crisis, humans now exist in two different 
modes. There is one in which they are still concerned with justice even 
when they know that perfect justice is never to be had. The “climate 
justice” historiography issues from this deeply human concern. Climate 
scientists’ history reminds us, on the other hand, that we now also have 
a mode of existence in which we—collectively and as a geophysical 
force and in ways we cannot experience ourselves—are “indifferent” 
or “neutral” (I do not mean these as mental or experienced states) to 
questions of intrahuman justice. We have run up against our own limits 
as it were. It is true that as beings for whom the question of Being is an 
eternal question, we will always be concerned about justice. But if we, 
collectively, have also become a geophysical force, then we also have a 
collective mode of existence that is justice-blind. Call that mode of being 
a “species” or something else, but it has no ontology, it is beyond biol-
ogy, and it acts as a limit to what we also are in the ontological mode. 
This is why the need arises to view the human simultaneously on con-
tradictory registers: as a geophysical force and as a political agent, as a 
bearer of rights and as author of actions; subject to both the stochastic 
forces of nature (being itself one such force collectively) and open to 
the contingency of individual human experience; belonging at once 
to differently-scaled histories of the planet, of life and species, and of 
human societies. One could say, mimicking Fanon, that in an age when 
the forces of globalization intersect with those of global warming, the 
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idea of the human needs to be stretched beyond where postcolonial 
thought advanced it. 
In Conclusion
A little more than half a century ago, “an earth-born object made by 
man”—the Sputnik—orbited the planet in outer space, “in the proximity 
of the heavenly bodies as though it had been admitted tentatively to their 
sublime company.” The author of these words, Hannah Arendt, thought 
that this event foretold a fundamental change in the human condition. 
The earth had been “unique in the universe in providing human beings 
with a habitat in which they can move and breathe without effort and 
without artifice,” but now clearly science was catching up with a thought 
that “up to then had been buried in the highly non-respectable literature 
of science fiction.” The Sputnik could be the first “step toward escape 
from man’s imprisonment to the earth.” “Should the emancipation and 
the secularization of the modern age,” asked Arendt, “ . . . end with 
[a] . . . fateful repudiation of an Earth who was the Mother of all living 
creatures under the sky?”40 Still, Arendt’s reading of this change in the 
human condition was optimistic. A critic of “mass society,” she saw the 
danger of such a society mainly in spiritual terms. A “mass society” could 
“threaten humanity with extinction” in spirit by rendering humans into 
a “society of laborers.”41 But it was in the same “mass society”—“where 
man as a social animal rules supreme”—that “the survival of the species 
could [now] be guaranteed on a world-wide scale,” thought Arendt.42 
The Sputnik was the first symbol, for her, of such optimism regarding 
the survival of the human species.
Today, with the crisis of anthropogenic climate change coinciding with 
multiple other crises of planetary proportions—of resources, finance, and 
food, not to speak of frequent weather-related human disasters—we know 
that the repudiation of the earth has come in a shape Arendt could not 
have even imagined in the optimistic and modernizing 1950s. Humans 
today are not only the dominant species on the planet, they also col-
lectively constitute—thanks to their numbers and their consumption of 
cheap fossil-fuel-based energy to sustain their civilizations—a geological 
force that determines the climate of the planet much to the detriment 
of civilization itself. Today, it is precisely the “survival of the species” on 
a “world-wide scale” that is largely in question. All progressive political 
thought, including postcolonial criticism, will have to register this pro-
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